An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which each player's action set is a finite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two "non-primitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (i) single-crossing in own action and type and (ii) quasisupermodularity in own action. Conditions (i,ii) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies supermodularity in own action and non-decreasing differences in own action and type. This result is applied to provide the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand, non-private values, and independent types.
1. introduction monotone methods have proven to be powerful in the study of games with strategic complementarity. For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) show that supermodular games possess several useful properties, including existence of pure strategy equilibrium, monotone comparative statics on equilibrium sets, and coincidence of the predictions of various solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) generalize these results to games with strategic complementarity including, as Athey (1998) shows, logsupermodular games with affiliated types.
This paper adds to this literature by providing sufficient conditions for existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium in games of incomplete infor-mation in which players have multidimensional actions and multidimensional types. A player's pure strategy is monotone (technically "isotone") when his action is non-decreasing along every dimension of his action space as his type increases along any dimension of his type space. The sufficient conditions for these existence results are satisfied in the two most widely studied sorts of games with strategic complementarity, supermodular games and logsupermodular games, given affiliated types. Isotonicity is important since it often provides testable empirical implications. For instance, in the Cournot with advertising example discussed in Section 2, lower production and advertising costs are each associated with (weakly) higher sales and advertising levels.
This paper departs from the usual strategic complements framework, however, and considers a broad class of games in which only some of the requirements of strategic complementarity are satisfied. For instance, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) require that each player's expected payoff function must satisfy single-crossing in own action and others' actions (informally, "complementarity across actions") and quasisupermodularity within own action (informally, "complementarity within own action"). This paper extends a new approach pioneered by Athey (2001) to develop monotone methods that apply to games of incomplete information which may fail to exhibit complementarity across actions but in which incremental expected payoffs to higher actions satisfy single-crossing in own type (informally, "monotone incremental returns in own type") when others adopt monotone strategies. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) do not require monotone incremental returns in own type to prove existence of a pure strategy equilibrium but, naturally, they can not guarantee existence of an isotone equilibrium.
In a setting with finitely many one dimensional actions and atomless one dimensional types, Athey (2001) shows that a non-decreasing pure strategy equilibrium exists when each player's interim expected payoff satisfies monotone incremental returns in own type given any non-decreasing strategies by others. This paper generalizes her result in a setting with multidimensional actions and multidimensional types, showing that an isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists when each player's interim expected payoff satisfies complementarity in own action and monotone incremental returns in own type given any isotone strategies by others. This result extends to games with a continuum action space whenever each player's ex post payoff is also continuous in his and others' actions, just as Athey (2001) 's results extend to this case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main existence result by applying it to games with a continuum action space and differentiable payoffs. Section 3 lays out the basic model of incomplete information games with finite action spaces and atomless types while Section 4 states the main theorem and gives three sets of sufficient primitive conditions. Section 5 applies the main theorem to provide the first general pure strategy equilibrium existence result for the uniform price auction when bidders have non-private values and independent types. Section 6 explores "the heart of the contribution" while the Appendix provides proofs.
illustration given differentiable payoffs
Consider an incomplete information game in which n players each receive a signal t i = (t is his ex post payoff and f (·|t i ) is the conditional p.d.f. of others' types given that player i's type is t i . Suppose also that π post i (a, t), f (t −i |t i ) are smooth functions of a, t and of t i , respectively so that π int i is differentiable in a i , t i . (Bold notation is used to refer to vectors of all players' actions and types.) A specialized version of Corollary 1 of the main theorem stated on page 18 applies to this class of games.
Corollary: Suppose that, for each bidder i = 1, ..., n and all actions a i , types t i , and isotone strategy profiles a −i (·) of others,
Then an isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
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For illustration purposes it is simplest to consider examples in which player types are independent, since then the cross-partial inequalities (1, 2) on expected payoffs are implied directly by the corresponding cross-partial inequalities on ex post payoffs.
Example (Cournot with 2 advertising channels, n firms): Consider an undifferentiated product Cournot competition game in which n risk neutral firms each choose a quantity q i and levels of two sorts of advertising e 1 i , e 2 i to expand the size of the total market. In the pharmaceutical context, for example, drug companies advertise to patients through media advertising and to doctors through detailing (such as office visits from company reps). Firms also receive multidimensional independent private information t i , where higher own type implies (weakly) lower own advertising and production costs. In particular, suppose that (i) D (p; e) = D(p) + γ(e) is total demand, (ii) φ i (e, t) is firm i's advertising cost function, and (iii) c i (q i ; t) is firm i's production cost function, 3 where q, e, t refer to vectors of all firms' quantities, advertising levels, and types. Firm i's ex post payoff is
where p (q, e) is the market clearing price. If there were just one advertising channel, an isotone pure strategy equilibrium would always exist in this example since
Given two advertising channels, similarly, an isotone equilibrium exists as long as
Note though that existence even of a unique isotone equilibrium does not provide the basis for monotone comparative statics. For example, suppose that a change in the tax code lowers all firms' production costs. In the new isotone equilibrium, some firms may produce and/or advertise less than they did in the original equilibrium.
model: incomplete information games
This Section lays out the model of incomplete information games with atomless types and finite action spaces.
Actions and Lattices
Definition (∨, ∧): Let (L, ≥) be a partially ordered set and let S ⊂ L. The least upper bound of S, ∨S, is the unique element of L (if it exists) satisfying ∨S ≤ c ⇔ a ≤ c for all a ∈ S and all c ∈ L. The greatest lower bound of S, ∧S, is the unique element of L satisfying ∧S ≥ c ⇔ a ≥ c for all a ∈ S and all c ∈ L. When S = {a, b}, I use the standard notation a ∨ b and a ∧ b.
complete if and only if ∨S, ∧S ∈ L 1 for every subset S ⊂ L 1 . Every finite sublattice is complete (Birkhoff (1967) ).
Assumption 1: Each player i = 1, ..., n has a common action set L ⊂ R k that is a finite sublattice of k dimensional Euclidean space with respect to the product order on R k .
4
A typical action is a i ≡ a
L. Similar subscript, superscript, and bold notation will be used consistently throughout the paper to refer to types and strategies as well as actions. For each m = 1, ..., k, define
Types and Strategies
Assumption 2: Player i's type t i is drawn from common support T = [0, 1] h . f : R nh → R + +, the joint density on type profiles (or states) t = (t 1 , ..., t n ), is bounded above by K and bounded below by K > 0.
5 The type space is endowed with the product order and the usual Euclidean topology and measure.
Definition (Pure strategy, Isotone pure strategy): A pure strategy (PS) a i (·) : T → L is a measurable function mapping each type into an action a i (t i ). In an isotone pure strategy (IPS),
S i denotes the space of all of player i's PS, S −i = Π j =i S j the space of others' PS profiles, and S = Π n i=1 S i the space of full PS profiles. Similarly, I i , I −i , and I are the spaces of own IPS, others' IPS profiles, and full IPS profiles.
Payoffs
Given a profile of actions a and types t, player i's ex post payoff (or utility) is Π post i (a, t). 
For the most part, I restrict attention to settings in which others follow IPS,
for all x , x ∈ L. (Weak inequality implies weak inequality and strict inequality implies strict.)
Definition (Single-crossing in (x, t) (or SC(x, t)) and in t (or SC(t))): Let (L, ≥, ∨, ∧) be a lattice and (T, ≥) a partially ordered set. g : L×T → R satisfies single-crossing in (x, t) if and only if
for all x > x ∈ L and all t > t ∈ T . Similarly, g : T → R satisfies single-crossing in t if and only if
, the incremental expected payoff to a i versus a i , satisfying SC(t i ) for all a i > a i and a −i (·) ∈ I −i .)
Best Response and Equilibrium
) denote player i's best response action set when others follow pure strategies a −i (·). When it can not cause confusion, I simplify this notation to BR i (t i ).
Definition (Isotone pure strategy equilibrium): a * (·) ∈ S is a pure strategy equilibrium (PSE) if and only if a *
Any PSE a * (·) ∈ I is called an isotone pure strategy equilibrium (IPSE).
existence of isotone equilibrium
Theorem 1: Under assumptions 1-5, an IPSE exists in games of incomplete information.
The proof is in the Appendix. A straightforward extension in which actions sets L = [0, 1] k and ex post payoffs are continuous in actions a is also provided in the Appendix.
Sufficient primitive conditions
I gather here three sets of primitive conditions that others' work proves are sufficient for interim expected payoff to satisfy quasisupermodularity in own action and single-crossing in own action and type (Assumptions 4,5). I refer the reader to this other work for the formal definitions of such standard terms as affiliated, supermodular, log-supermodular, and non-decreasing differences.
1. Types are affiliated and Π post i (a, t) is supermodular in (a, t j ) for all j. In this case, Athey (2002) 
2. Types are affiliated and Π post i (a, t) is log-supermodular in (a, t). In this case, Athey (1998) 
3. Types are independent and Π post i (a, t) is supermodular in a i with nondecreasing differences in (a i , t i ). Then expected payoff Π int i (a i , t i ; a −i (·)) is supermodular in a i and has non-decreasing differences in (a i , t i ) when a −i (·) ∈ S −i . (Others may follow any strategies.) See Topkis (1979) .
In Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) , a supermodular game is one in which Π post i (a, t) is supermodular in a, with no conditions placed on the distribution of types. Thus, the primitive conditions of cases 1,2 are only satisfied in a subclass of supermodular (and log-supermodular) games. This stands to reason, of course, since I prove that an isotone PSE exists whereas Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) 
example: uniform price auction
Proving existence of PSE in the uniform price auction with multi-unit demand is particularly challenging since payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity (Milgrom and Shannon (1994) does not apply) and fail to satisfy diagonal quasiconcavity (Reny (1999) 6 does not apply). Indeed, the only general PSE existence theorems that I am aware of that apply to the uniform price auction require private values. Jackson and Swinkels (2001) prove existence of PSE with positive probability of trade in two sided 7 or one sided uniform price auctions given private values and a very general correlation structure. Bresky (2000) proves existence of IPSE given independent private values. Like Bresky (2000) , my application of Theorem 1 requires independent types but proves IPSE existence in a setting that allows for a much more general structure of values. model: n bidders and S identical objects (or units) for sale. Information and Payoffs: Bidder i receives value V i (q, t) from the allocation q = (q 1 , ..., q n ) in the state t = (t 1 , ..., t n ), where t i are i.i.d. with common support [0, 1] h . V i is piecewise continuous in t and
is non-decreasing in t i whenever q i > q i and q j ≤ q j for all j = i. (No other assumptions on values.) Bidders seek to maximize expected surplus, the difference between their value and payment.
Bids: A permissible bid is a vector
be the kth highest unit-bid across all bid schedules. Define q i ≡ max{q :
is the least (greatest) quantity that bidder i can receive in any market clearing allocation.
q i and quantity is rationed in the following manner:
8 Each bidder is assigned at least q i and randomly ordered into a ranking ρ to ration the remaining quantity
− q i 1 and repeat this process with bidder i 2 = ρ(2) and so on until all quantity has been assigned.
Payment: A variety of uniform price payment rules have been considered in the literature. I study here the two most common: in the Sth (or S + 1st) price auctions, all bidders pay the lowest winning bid b S (or highest losing bid b S+1 ) on all units that they win, i.e. total payment
Several features of the model are worthy of note:
1. The formulation of bidder values includes as a special case the benchmark "interdependent values" in which bidder i's value for q i units takes the form V i (q i , t) and all incremental values V i (q i , t)−V i (q i , t) (for q i > q i ) are typically assumed to be non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in t i .
2. Some sorts of externalities are permitted. Values take the form V i (q, t), with the only monotonicity restriction being that incremental values V i (q , t) − V i (q, t) are non-decreasing in own type whenever q i > q i and q j ≤ q j for all j = i. In other words, bidders may care about what other bidders win with the caveat that "own marginal values" are nondecreasing in own type. (Such a monotonicity assumption is present, for instance, in Jehiel, Moldavanu, and Stacchetti (1996) .)
3. Bidders receive multidimensional private information and values need not be strictly increasing in own type. For example, part of a bidder's information may be relevant to own values given certain allocations but not given other allocations.
4. Values need not be monotone at all in others' private information.
5. Marginal values may be increasing in own quantity, allowing for increasing returns to scale in consumption. On the other hand, I continue to make the standard requirement that bids be non-increasing in quantity to guarantee existence of a market clearing allocation.
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Theorem 2: An IPSE exists in this model of the uniform price auction.
Proof sketch: The set of all non-increasing bid schedules forms a lattice with respect to the product order. Thus, it suffices to check that Assumptions 4,5 are satisfied. In fact, I prove in the Appendix that two stronger conditions hold:
) is modular in own bid (see below) for all types t i and all profiles of others' strategies (isotone or not) and (ii) Π int i (·, ·; b −i (·; ·)) has non-decreasing differences in own bid and type for all profiles of others' strategies.
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Non-decreasing differences (NDD): The intuition behind NDD of expected payoffs is clear. First, note that ex post payment has zero differences in own bid and type since payment does not depend on type. Next, ex post values have NDD since submitting a higher bid (holding others' bids fixed) always leads one to win weakly greater quantity and others to win weakly less quantity. And by assumption ex post incremental value from such a change in the allocation is non-decreasing in own type. Finally, NDD is preserved under integration 11 so expected payoffs have NDD no matter what strategies others follow. (Independence is crucial in this step.)
for all x , x ∈ L. i (·) are their upper and lower envelopes, respectively. Given any state t, profile of others' bids b −i (·; t −i ) and rationing ordering ρ, the auction mechanism maps each of these four bids into four allocations (shorthand
, ρ) and so on) and into four uniform prices (shorthand
) and so on). The key step of the modularity proof is to show that i . Furthermore, it is easy to observe that all other bidders receive the same quantity after either bid as well. Similarly, price and the allocation are identical whether bidder i submits b
In other words, the pair of outcomes (allocation and price) of the auction after submitting bids b
Consequently, bidder i's ex post surplus also "matches up" in this sense. Thus the expectation of any function of ex post surplus, taken with respect to any distribution over types, will itself be modular. In particular, as long as bidder utility takes the form u i (V i , Z i ), then expected utility will be modular in own bid regardless of the type distribution.
6. heart of the contribution Theorem 1, the paper's main result, is essentially a corollary of the powerful Monotonicity Theorem of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) (hereafter MS). Indeed, in my view, the main contribution of this paper is to uncover the structure possessed by arg max x g(x, t) when x and t are multidimensional and g satisfies the conditions of the Monotonicity Theorem. This structure in turn happens to be exactly what is required to extend Athey (2001)'s ingenious approach to proving existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium to a setting with multidimensional actions and multidimensional types. It seems worthwhile, then, to discuss these prior contributions and thereby indicate what I feel is at the heart of my contribution.
Monotonicity Theorem
First, I state a weakened version of the Monotonicity Theorem, for which two more definitions are needed.
Definition (Increasing in the strong set order): Let (L, ≥, ∨, ∧) be a lattice and (T, ≥) a partially ordered set. A correspondence g : T → P(L) is increasing in the strong set order if and only if g(t ) ≥ L g(t) whenever t > t.
Theorem (Milgrom and Shannon (1994) 
is a complete lattice and (T, ≥) a partially ordered set. Then arg max x∈L g(x, t) is a complete sublattice for all t and increasing in the strong set order if g satisfies QSP M (x) and SC(x, t).
Given the Monotonicity Theorem, it is not surprising that Assumptions 4 and 5 of my model (QSPM(own action) and SC(own action, own type) of expected payoffs whenever others follow isotone strategies) are associated with a result proving existence of IPSE. These conditions guarantee that each player always has an isotone pure best response strategy whenever others follow isotone pure strategies: For a given profile of others' isotone pure strategies a −i (·), Assumptions 4,5 and the Monotonicity Theorem imply that player i's set of best response actions, BR i (t i , a −i (·)), is a complete sublattice for all types t i and that BR i (·, a −i (·)) is increasing in the strong set order. Since action sets are finite, also, these sets are non-empty. Consequently, an isotone selection exists from BR i (·, a −i (·)).
Athey's Vector Representation
Of course, existence of an isotone best response is far from guaranteeing isotone equilibrium. At the heart of the existence result is an extension of Athey (2001)'s remarkable proof that there is a sense in which each bidder's set of isotone pure best response strategies is convex. This convexity then is used to apply Glicksberg (1952) 's Fixed Point Theorem to a best response correspondence whose domain and range are restricted to the set of IPS profiles. To be more precise, given one dimensional finite action sets (say {0, 1, 2, ..., z}) and one dimensional atomless types (say drawn from [0, 1]), Athey observes that any non-decreasing strategy can be identified, up to the actions played by a zero measure set of types, with an z dimensional non-decreasing vector of types (perhaps with repetition) at which the player "increases" his action. For instance, when z = 3, the set of all strategies a i : [0, 1] → {0, 1, 2, 3} such that a i (t i ) = 0 for t i < 1/2, a i (t i ) = 2 for t i ∈ (1/2, 3/4), and a i (t i ) = 3 for t i > 3/4 gets mapped to the vector (1/2, 1/2, 3/4). Say that two isotone strategies a i (·), a i (·) are equivalent if and only if Pr t i (a i (t i ) = a i (t i )) = 1. It's easy to see that each such equivalence class of isotone strategies maps to a different vector, and that the range of this bijection is a compact, convex subset of R z . Furthermore, this mapping is a homeomorphism with respect to the usual Euclidean topology on R z and the topology on strategies corresponding to the metric
). An important property of this topology is that each bidder's expected payoff is continuous in others' strategies 13 whenever payoffs are bounded. (See Athey (2001) .)
Convexity of Isotone Best Response Strategies
Why is the image of player i's set of isotone pure best response strategies under the Athey map a convex subset of R z ? Take as known that his expected payoffs (given others' strategies a −i (·)) satisfy the requirements of the Monotonicity Theorem. Then the fact that his best response action set is increasing in the strong set order implies that a i ∈ BR(t i ) for all t i < t i < t i whenever a i ∈ BR(t i ) ∩ BR(t i ). Now, convexity of the image of the isotone best responses is clear. For example, when z = 2, suppose that w 1 = (1/2, 3/4) and w 2 = (0, 1/4) both correspond to isotone best response strategies; a convex combination of these vectors is w 1 /2+w 2 /2 = (1/4, 1/2). Revealed preference implies directly that all types in [0, 1/2] find 0 to be a best response, all in [0, 1/4) ∪ (1/2, 3/4) find 1 a best response, and all in (1/4, 1] find 2 a best response. To conclude that w 1 /2 + w 2 /2 corresponds to an isotone best response, however, we also need to know that types in (1/4, 1/2) find 1 to be a best response. But the Monotonicity Theorem implies indirectly that all types in [0, 3/4) find 1 to be a best response. It's easy to see that the same logic applies to all convex combinations of any two isotone pure best response strategies. (See Athey (2001) .) Indeed, this approach applies as well to settings with multidimensional types and multidimensional actions. Surprisingly, the extension to multidimensional types is relatively straightforward while that to multidimensional actions is much more subtle and difficult.
Multidimensional types, one dimensional actions: When a player follows an IPS, his type space is divided into regions in which each action is played such that no type in the a i -region is less than any type in the a i -region whenever a i > a i . To represent player i's strategy as a vector, I partition player i's type space into many one dimensional subsets of the form C(t 2 and L = {0, 1, 2}. The number 0,1,2 in each region of the type space is the action played by types in that region. Suppose that IPS corresponding to the two vectors illustrated in Figure 2 are both best responses. Revealed preference directly implies that all types play a best response action in any strategy corresponding to the convex combination vector illustrated in Figure 3 except for the upper left part of the type region playing action 1. On the other hand, note that for every type t i in the interior of this "1-region" there is a pair of types {t i , t i } contained within the union of the 1-regions corresponding to the two original strategies such that t i < t i < t i . Thus, again, the fact that BR i (t i , a −i (·)) is increasing in the strong set order implies that every such type t i must find 1 to be a best response since both t i , t i do. Note that this verification of convexity, like Athey's, does not at all leverage the fact that BR i (t i , a −i (·)) is a lattice. The subtle and difficult part is proving that the image of the isotone pure best response strategies is convex. An example highlights some of the issues involved. Several new actions are played in the strategy a i (t i ; w 1 /2 + w 2 /2) and no type t i plays an action that he played under either original strategy. Thus, revealed preference tells us nothing about whether the new strategy is a best response. Even the fact that the set of types who find each action to be a best response is convex does not help us at all. Rather, to conclude that each type plays a best response action, one must repeatedly apply both the fact that the best response action set is a lattice and that it is increasing in the strong set order. For example, consider a type t i ∈ (3/8, 1/2). By the lattice property, type t i finds (2, 0, 1) = (0, 0, 1) ∨ (2, 0, 0) to be a best response whereas types t i ∈ (1/2, 3/4) (greater than t i ) find (1, 1, 0) = (1, 1, 2) ∧ (2, 1, 0) to be a best response. Now we can use increasingness in the strong set order to conclude that (2, 0, 1) ∧ (1, 1, 0) = (1, 0, 0) ∈ BR i (t i ). Finally, again using the lattice property, (1, 0, 0) ∨ (0, 0, 1) = (1, 0, 1) ∈ BR i (t i ) and we are done. The proof for the general case is very similar. For each type t i , I prove by induction that the required action a i = (a ).
conclusion
This paper shows how two non-primitive conditions, quasisupermodularity in own action and single-crossing in own action and type of interim expected payoff whenever others follow isotone strategies, are sufficient for existence of an isotone pure strategy equilibrium in a very general setting with finitely many multidimensional actions and a continuum of multidimensional types. Furthermore, these conditions are satisfied in a variety of important classes of games such as supermodular and log-supermodular games with affiliated types as well as in some games in which strategic complementarity fails. For instance, as an application of the main theorem, I provide the first proof of equilibrium existence in pure strategies (indeed, isotone pure strategies) when bidders have non-private values and independent types in the uniform price auction.
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Corollary 1: Under assumptions 1',2-6, an IPSE exists in games of incomplete information.
Proof. The proof closely follows that of Theorem 2 in Athey (2001) , and I refer to the reader to this proof for most details. The only potentially substantial difference is that each player's action is multidimensional, so one must argue that any sequence of IPS profiles a j (·) in a sequence of games having finer and finer action spaces has a subsequence that converges to an IPS profile a * (·) in the limiting game having a continuum action space.
14 But it is straightforward to apply Helly's Selection Theorem to the sequences a m j (·) separately, each of which has a subsequence converging to a m * (·).
Proof of Theorem 1
Athey map: The Athey map A i sends each IPS a i (·) ∈ I i to a vector, 
The Athey map induces a bijection between equivalence classes of IPS in I i and equivalence classes of vectors in A i . (When I refer to "the Athey map" from here on I mean to refer to this induced bijection although for simplicity I will use notation as if the domain is I i and the range A i ). To see why, note first by the model's assumptions on the distribution of types there exist 0 < K ≤ K so that f i (t
i . Consequently, (3) holds if and only if Pr t i (a i (t i ) = a i (t i )) = 1. Homeomorphism: Indeed, Pr t i (a i,n (t i ) = a i, * (t i )) → n→∞ 1 if and only if
Thus, the Athey map is a homeomorphism with respect to the topologies on equivalence classes in
Closed Range: By homeomorphism, it suffices to show that any limit point of I i is an element of I i . So suppose that {a i,n (·)} is a sequence of IPS converging to a i, * (·). Clearly, a i, * (·) is isotone when restricted to the set of types at which it prescribes exactly the same action as a i,n (·) (for all n > N * and any N * ). By convergence of {a i,n (·)}, then, a i, * (·) must be isotone when restricted to some full measure set of types. And any such strategy can be modified on a zero measure set so that it becomes an IPS, i.e. the equivalence class containing a i, * (·) includes an IPS.
Compact Range: By Tychonoff's Theorem, 15 closedness implies that the range is compact with respect to the topology of pointwise convergence. But the topology that I am using is coarser than this one, so the range must be compact with respect to my topology as well.
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Convex Range: Lemma 1 below characterizes the range of the Athey map. This range is convex since (4, 5) are preserved under convex combination. That is to say, if A i (a i (·)), A i (a i (·)) each satisfy (4, 5), then so does αA i (a i (·))+ (1 − α)A i (a i (·)) for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 1: a i (·) is an isotone strategy if and only if
Proof. a i (·) isotone if and only if a To prove (4), suppose otherwise that
In this case, a
Closed Graph: Let A −i : I −i → A −i and A : I → A denote the composite Athey map taking IPS profiles into vector profiles. For each IPS profile
) denote the set of player i's best response IPS:
Recall from Section 6.1 that BR ≥ i is non-empty-valued. Furthermore, note that player i's interim expected payoffs are continuous in a −i (·) with respect to our topology. This guarantees that BR ≥ i has a closed graph. A −1 (a −1 (·))) , ..., Λ n (A −n (a −n (·)))) .
The arguments presented so far imply that (i) A is a convex, compact subset of a convex topological linear space (indeed, of a vector space) and (ii) Λ is non-empty-valued (iii) with a closed graph. All that remains to be able to invoke Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem is that Λ (or each Λ i ) is convexvalued. This is the most important technical result in the paper, so I label it as a theorem.
Theorem 3: Λ i is convex-valued for all players i.
IPSE exists:
To complete the proof of Theorem 1 given Theorem 3, I need to show that the equivalence class of strategies corresponding to any fixed point of Λ contains an IPSE. Suppose that A(a * (·)) is a fixed point of Λ (for a * (·) ∈ I). This does not imply that a * (·) is an IPSE since some zero measure set of types may be playing a non-best response. But a * (·) ≡ a(·) for some profile a(·) such that a i (·) ∈ BR ≥ i (a * −i (·)) for all i and a(·) is an IPSE: Player i always plays a best response under a i (·) and all others' best responses do not change as i modifies his action over a zero measure set of types.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. By the discussion in the text, it suffices to show that each bidder's ex post valuation has NDD in own bid and own type and both his ex post valuation and ex post payment are modular in own bid. In the following, I consider bidder 1 only and fix the profile of others' bids b −1 (·), the rationing ranking ρ, and the state t. The analysis focuses on properties of the realized allocation and payment when bidder 1 submits one of two bids
; ρ) and so on for the other bids b 2 (·), b 1∨2 (·), and b 1∧2 (·). (Note that while bidder 1's bid varies, others' bids are held fixed.) Similarly, define Characterizing the allocation: Define bidder 1's rationing function to be
is the amount that would be left for bidder 1 if all ahead of him in the rationing ranking ρ were given their maximum demand at price p and all behind him were given their minimal demand at that price. By design of the assumed rationing rule,
or, equivalently,
Both approaches, based on b S and on b S+1 , lead to the same rationing outcome because rationing only occurs when
implies that there is a unique market clearing allocation, and both approaches lead to that allocation. More explicitly,
NDD in own bid and own type: By (6), observe that q * 1 (b 1 (·), b −1 (·); ρ) is non-decreasing and q * j (b(·); ρ) (j = i) non-increasing in own bid b 1 (·) for any given b −1 (·), ρ. Thus, bidder i's ex post valuation for the allocation, V 1 (q * (b(·); ρ), t), has non-decreasing differences in own bid and type.
Modularity in own bid: 
Further, if condition (A) holds for bids b 1 (·), b 2 (·), then the analogous condition must hold for bids b 1∧2 (·), b 1∨2 (·), and similarly for conditions (B,C). So, without loss, suppose that q is entirely analogous, the key steps being to show that max
Proof of Theorem 3
Preliminaries: The type space has partition T = {C(t
Let a i (·; α) be any isotone strategy in the equivalence class in the pre-image of αA i (a i (·)) + (1 − α)A i (a i (·)) with respect to the Athey map. All equivalent strategies specify the same action for all but the zero measure set of types D i at which player i's action increases along some dimension in strategy a i (·; α): (·; α) ; m, j, t −1 i ) for some m, j ∈ L m }. I need to prove only that, for all types t i ∈ D i , a i (t i ; α) is a best response given that both a i (·), a i (·) are isotone best response strategies. What I will show is even stronger: a i (t i ; α) is a best response given only that the actions played by types in C(t i . Thus, subsequently, I will treat the notationally simpler case in which T = [0, 1]: I will drop all superscripts, and any reference to the full set of player i's types refers instead to the one dimensional subset C(t
(Subscripts denoting player identity are dropped when referring to actions for simplicity. This should not cause confusion since I only refer to player i throughout the entire proof.) Part 1: In this part of the proof, I identify structure on bidder i's best response actions BR i (·) that suffices for the convexity conclusion. (This structure is laid out here as Working Assumptions.) The second part then proves that this structure is present as long as the conditions of the Monotonicity Theorem are satisfied.
Working Assumption 1: Player i's typet i has best response actions a, a such that a ≥ a(α) ≥ a.
Working Assumption 2: For each dimension j = 1, ..., k of the action space, there exist types t
has a best response actionà such thatà 1,...,j ≥ a 1,...,j (α),à j+1 = a j+1 (α), and a j+2,...,k ≤ a j+2,...,k (α), and (iii) type t j i has a best response actionȃ such that a 1,...,j ≤ a 1,...,j (α),ȃ j+1 = a j+1 (α), andȃ j+2,...,k ≥ a j+2,...,k (α). Figure 4 : Illustration of induction step Given these two working assumptions, an induction argument proves that a(α) is a best response action for player i's typet i , i.e. a(α) ∈ BR i (t i ).
Base step (j = 0): a, a ∈ BR i t i , where a ≥ a i (α) ≥ a.
Base step is satisfied by Working Assumption 1. By Working Assumption 2 and the fact that BR i (·) is increasing in the strong set order,ä ≡à ∧á ∈ BR i (t i ) andã ≡ȃ ∨ȧ ∈ BR i (t i ). (It is easily checked thatä 1,...,j+1 = a 1,...,j+1 (α) andä j+2,...,k ≤ a j+2,...,k (α) as well as thatã 1,...,j+1 = a 1,...,j+1 (α) andã j+2,...,k ≥ a j+2,...,k (α).) This notation heavy step is illustrated in Figure  4 . The block from 1 to j is labelled ≤ in theȃ box to represent the fact that a 1,...,j ≤ a 1,...,j (α), and so on. The four actionsã,á,ȧ,ä ∈ BR i (t i ) whereas a ∈ BR i (t j i ) andà ∈ BR i (t j i ). This completes the induction step and hence the proof of Theorem 3 given the two Working Assumptions.
Part 2: Now I prove that Working Assumptions 1, 2 are satisfied given that BR i (·) is non-empty-and lattice-valued and increasing in the strong set order. First, I develop some needed machinery that applies to any fixed dimension m ∈ {1, ..., k} of the action space. Let
First point: revealed preference. Given that a i (·), a i (·) are best response strategies, revealed preference implies that a m (α) ∈ BR m i (t i ) for all types t i who play an action with a m (α) as its mth coordinate in either strategy. This includes all types
is the closure of the order interval of types who play an action with mth coordinate a m (α) in the strategy a i (·). Similarly, S a m (α) (a i (·)) contains types who play an action with mth coordinate a m (α) in the strategy a i (·). Define shorthand Second point: reduce to 1/2-1/2 convex combinations. The set of types t i ∈ D i such that a i (t i , α) = a m (α) is the interior of the interval
where this is the usual convex combination of sets. In particular, for any such type t i , the action a i (t i ; α) = a i (t i ;α) for allα in a neighborhood of α. Thus, I only need to prove that a i (t i ; α) ∈ BR i (t i ) for α belonging to a dense subset of [0, 1] . By an induction argument, therefore, it suffices to prove that a i (t i ; 1/2) ∈ BR i (t i ) (i.e. for α = 1/2).
Third point: some type has best response action whose mth coordinate equals a m (1/2). Sincet i / ∈ D i , one of the intervals S a m (1/2) (a i (·)), S a m (1/2) (a i (·)) must have non-empty interior. Thus, there must be some type t i so that either a
Fourth point: m properties.
where S a m (1/2) (a i (·; 1/2)) was defined in the first point. Thus,
also has non-empty interior. Define
In words, m is the maximum length y such thatt i −y ∈ L m andt i +y ∈ H m . Key properties of m include:
1. m > 0: Follows from the fact that W has non-empty interior and min W ≥t i . (This fact will be used in Part 2 when I argue that typeŝ t i − m + ε andt i + m − ε have a best response action with mth coordinate equal to a m (1/2).) So defined,ȃ ∈ BR i (t j i ) by repeated application of increasingness in the strong set order and, as can easily be checked,ȃ 1,...,j ≤ a 1,...,j (α),ȃ j+1 = a j+1 (α), andȃ j+2,...,k ≥ a j+2,...,k (α). This step is illustrated in Figure 6 . (Each diagram representing an action is placed above the type that finds that action to be a best response.) The argument when (9) holds is entirely symmetric. This completes the verification of Working Assumption 2 and hence the proof of Theorem 3. 8 This rationing rule is a special case of the "randomized rationing rule" described in McAdams (2002) that applies for any supply correspondence.
It can not be that botht
9 The same analysis goes through, however, if the permissible bid set is any sublattice of the set of non-increasing bid schedules. This allows for differing minimal bids on different quantities as well as making undifferentiated product Bertrand and Cournot competition special cases.
10 Modularity implies quasisupermodularity and non-decreasing differences of expected payoff implies single-crossing of incremental expected payoff.
11 If f (·, ·, θ) has NDD for all θ ∈ Θ and λ is a finite measure over Θ, then θ∈Θ f (·, ·, θ)dλ(θ) has NDD.
12 MS have a stronger "if and only if" formulation that also accounts for how the arg max x g(x, t) set varies with a constraint S ⊂ L. I do not leverage this aspect of their result, since each player's action set is fixed in my work. 13 The metric on others' strategy profiles is |a −i (·) − a −i (·)| = j =i |a j (·) − a j (·)| 14 For this limiting argument, the relevant topology on the space of isotone strategies is the topology of pointwise convergence inherited from the usual Euclidean topologies on the type space [0, 1] k and the limiting action space [0, 1] k (which contains all action spaces along the sequence).
15 See for instance Reed and Simon (1980, p. 100) . 
